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We model the safety net problem as a social dilemma game involving moral 
hazard, risk taking and limited liability. The safety net game is compared to both 
an individual decision task involving full liability and the deterministic public 
goods game. We report experimental data to show that limited liability leads to 
higher risk taking in comparison to full liability; nevertheless, the difference is 
much smaller than predicted by theory. In the safety net game, subjects behave as if 
socially responsible for the losses they impose on the group. With repetition, 
nevertheless, a gradual emergence of the moral hazard problem arises. (JEL C9, 
D7, D8, H4, I1, I3) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In many parts of the industrialized world it is believed that the more equally and widely 
we share the risks of illness, unemployment and poverty, the better off is the population 
as a whole. A variety of social safety nets and state-sponsored insurance schemes are the 
result of the policies which prevent any individual from falling into misery beyond a 
certain level. In its core, a social safety net is a transfer of risk and liability from the 
citizen to society. Detractors of safety nets regard these risk and liability transfers not as 
the solution to misfortune but as the problem. It is argued that the assumption of 
individual liabilities by the society reduces the incentives to mitigate risks and adversely 
affects people’s behavior. This moral hazard problem (Pauly1968) was mentioned in the 
context of recent governmental bailouts. The argument that gains are privatized but losses 
are socialized suggests a susceptibility to excessive risk taking in safety nets.  
Beyond its theoretical importance, very few empirical studies have provided evidence for 
the significance of moral hazard, and these studies have produced mixed results. Some 
authors indicate higher risk taking among insured institutions or subjects (Grossman 
1992; Dionne et al. 2005), whereas others find no difference in the comparison to the 
uninsured (Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet 2003). Surprisingly little evidence has been 
reported on the abuse of safety nets in health care (e.g. Wolfe and Goddeeris 1991; 
Breyer, Zweifel and Kifmann 2004), or unemployment (e.g. Pallage and Zimmermann 
2001).   
Generally, the collection of reliable empirical data on higher risk taking rates under 
limited liabilities vis-à-vis full liability is a challenging task. Risk taking behavior can 
only be estimated indirectly from empirical data, and specification problems (Abbring, 
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Chiappori an d Pinquet 2003) loom as frequently, for instance in the case of private 
insurance, moral hazard and adverse selection are hard to tell apart. So, it is difficult to 
judge the significance of moral hazard in safety nets based on empirical data alone. As 
alternative and additional data source we propose economics experiments. Thus, the 
impact of liability changes on risk taking can be studied through direct observation of 
human behavior, and problems of data ambiguity can be excluded by design. 
We model the safety net problem as a social dilemma game in which players are exposed 
to the risk of individual losses that are assured by the group. The behavior in this game 
where individual players face limited liability is benchmarked with the behavior under 
full liability, where individual decision making occurs in the absence of a safety net. 
Given standard assumptions, the equilibrium predictions for both scenarios are divergent. 
For the full-liability case, expected utility maximization requires a maximum level of loss 
avoidance measures. In contrast, minimum loss avoidance levels are exerted in the unique 
equilibrium of the safety net game. Our experimental data show both predictions are too 
extreme. In both treatments, the average loss avoidance levels are chosen in the interior 
upper half of the action space. The evidence thus suggests that subjects do not free-ride 
on the safety net as much as the theoretical solution suggests. Similar evidence has been 
reported in the experimental literature on public goods games following the seminal 
paper by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984), which share similarities to our safety net 
game. In particular our study closely relates to public goods experiments involving risk. 
This literature, which we briefly survey in the following section, investigates how 
elements of risk affect behavior in public goods games. We contribute to this literature as 
we use a linear public goods game in a loss framing as a second benchmark treatment to 
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the safety net game. Both games yield the same equilibrium predictions, but we report 
steadily higher loss avoidance levels for the safety net game. In comparison to this 
benchmark treatment, complete free riding is largely reduced and loss avoidance levels 
are shifted to the upper half of the action space. We argue that subjects display a higher 
level of social responsibility in the safety net game than in the public goods game, 
because they react to the occurrence of a loss in an adaptive way. Other things equal, they 
increase rather than decrease their avoidance levels after a loss has occurred.  
The paper is organized as follows. After a short review of the experimental literature in 
section 2 we consider the theoretical framework of the safety net game and its 
benchmarks in section 3. In section 4 we introduce the experimental parameters and 
detail the procedures of the experimental design. In section 5, we report the experimental 
results, and in section 6 we conclude.   
II. REVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTAL LITERATURE 
The main stream of experimental research on problems of moral hazard focuses on the 
two-player principal agent problem (Holmstrom 1979). Testing the subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the game including the incentive compatibility requirement (Berg, Daley, 
Dickhaut, and O’Brien 1992; Epstein 1992; Güth, Klose, Königstein, and Schwalbach 
1998; Keser and Willinger 2000; 2007) and reciprocity in work contracts (Anderhub, 
Königstein, and Gächter 2002; Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger 1997, Gächter and 
Königstein 2009) have been the focuses of this research. The results of this research 
suggest that if the agent is promised a fair reward by the principal, the agent will 
reciprocate this fairness. The moral hazard problem turns into a threat of negative 
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reciprocity for perceived unfairness. Such reciprocity and fairness concerns are an issue 
in our safety net game too. We report that the individual loss avoidance levels are 
correlated to the lagged losses in the group. Nonetheless, in comparison to the principal-
agent literature the safety net game involves multiple players who make their decisions 
simultaneously.  
Closely related to our study are public goods experiments that investigate the effects of 
risk on cooperation. Generally, the results of this literature vary depending on the 
experimental design. Two categories of risky public goods games have been studied. The 
first one which includes the safety net game involves the pooling of individual risks, and 
the second category involves the pooling of individual contributions to a risky public 
good. The existing experimental investigations in the first category have found mixed 
results (Berger and Hershey 1994; Gong, Baron and Kuhnreuter 2009). Berger and 
Hershey report smaller and Gong, Baron and Kuhnreuter report larger cooperation levels 
when individual risks are involved. Both studies consider binary choice situations, where 
the risk of a loss can either be fully accepted or the loss can be fully insured. In contrast 
to these studies, our safety net game has a rather continuous action space, where the 
amount of risk is subject to choice. We observe that most chosen loss avoidance levels 
are in the interior upper half of the action space, and cooperation levels are larger than in 
the deterministic public goods game. The action space of the referenced studies thus does 
not contain the chosen actions of our experiment. The studies of Gangadharan and Nemes 
2009, Dickinson 1998, Hasson, Löfgren, and Visser (2010), and Burger and Kolstad 
(2009) fall into the second category of risky public goods games where the sum of 
individual contribution to the public good is subject to risk of being lost.1 A chance event 
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which follows up on subjects’ contributions to the public good determines with fixed 
probability if subjects receive a payoff from their contributions to the public good or if 
the contributions are lost. Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) and Dickinson (1998), 
furthermore, consider a treatment where, similarly to our safety net game but applied to 
the group contribution, the probability of loss avoidance is positively correlated with the 
sum of contributions. In comparison to our safety net game environment, loss avoidance 
depends not only on the individual contribution but also on the contribution of the others. 
Therefore it may not be surprising that contribution levels are lower in their risky 
treatment than in their baseline treatment where such risk does not exist.  
The literature abounds on studies related to our public goods control treatment; see 
surveys by Hey (1991) or Ledyard (1995). Differing from the experimental main stream 
approach, however, we apply a loss framing in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1981). Shanley and Grossman (2007) conducted public goods game experiments in a 
negative framing and in a positive framing to observe higher cooperation levels in the 
standard positive framing. We have no control to investigate if our loss framing leads to 
similar relative results.  
Finally, DiMauro (2002) studies a related experiment to our full liability treatment, 
where subjects make an individual decision under risk or uncertainty by choosing a loss 
avoidance level to decrease the probability of the loss. She compares the effect of risk 
and uncertainty, and reports higher average loss avoidance levels under uncertainty than 
under risk. 
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III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section introduces and derives the theoretical predictions of the safety net game. The 
safety net game involves collective risk sharing in the group. Individuals take costly loss 
avoidance measures, but collectively indemnify the incurred losses. Thus the originator 
of a social loss has limited liability as she shares the loss in the same way as everyone 
else. The alternative to this scenario is full liability, where, in absence of a safety net, 
individuals must cover their entire loss alone.   
Individual decision problem (IND): full liability  
To avoid a loss 0>L , an individual i  chooses a loss avoidance level ];0[ xxi ∈ . For the 
given loss avoidance level x , )(xp  is the conditional probability of loss avoidance of a 
Bernoulli distribution. The derivative of the probability function with respect to x , 
denoted by )(' xp , is strictly positive for all intermediate loss avoidance levels. At the 
boundaries, it is assumed the loss is incurred (avoided) with certainty if loss avoidance is 
zero (at the maximum level). The unit cost of loss avoidance is 0>c . The individual 
maximizes the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function described in equation (1), 
where Lxca +>  denotes the amount of owned assets, and )(yui  is the utility of 
consequence y . 
(1) )())(1()()();( LcxauxpcxauxpLxU iiiiiiii −−−+−=  
We assume the loss is significant, that the individual is risk averse or risk neutral and that 
s/he seeks to maximize expected utility. For our purpose of predicting the individual 
decisions in the experiment, a case of special interest is the extreme one, where utility 
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maximization implies the choice of the maximum loss avoidance level. A sufficient 
assumption for such a corner solution is given by ),0()(' xxcLxp ii ∈∀≥ , that is, the 
marginal advantage of loss avoidance weakly exceeds its marginal costs, and at the upper 
boundary xxxcL i =≥ , . This assumption involves the economically interesting cases for 
the full liability case. Under standard rationality assumptions, thus, only risk seekers 
choose a non-maximal loss avoidance level. 
The safety net game (SNG): limited liability 
Consider a group of n  individuals who face the described individual decision problem, 
but who decide to collectively and equally share all individual losses incurred within the 
group. The thus created safety net implies that each player has the same liability for 
his/her own loss as for the losses of everyone else. The expected utility thus depends also 
on the loss avoidance levels taken by the other individuals in the group. In the safety net 
game the individual maximizes the probability weighted utility of each possible outcome.  
(2)
( )
( )
{ }
( )
( )
( )Lcxauxp
nLncxauxpxpxp
nLcxauxpxpxp
nLcxauxpxp
cxauxpLxxU
ii
n
j
j
ii
n
j jjjj
jjkjj
ii
n
j jj jjk
kjj
ii
n
j jk
kj
ii
n
k
kiii
nn
nn
−−×−+
−−−×⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ×−××−+
−−×⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ×−×−+
−−×⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ×−+
−×=
∏
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∏
∑ ∏
∏
=
= ≠
≠
= ≠ ≠
= ≠
=
−
−−
−−
1
1 },..,,{
},..,{
1 ,
1
1
1
))(1(
/)1()())(1(...))(1(...
.....
/2)())(1())(1(
/)())(1(
)(),;(
1 2211
1111
1 12 21
21
1 1
 
Taking the loss avoidance levels of the others as given, a necessary condition for positive 
equilibrium levels of loss avoidance is ),0(/)(' xxcnLxp ii ∈∀≥  or at the boundary 
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xxxcnL i =≥ ,/ . In contrast, if the marginal costs exceed the individual marginal benefit 
of loss avoidance, ii xcnLxp ∀</)(' ,2 as we are going to assume in the experiment, 
expected utility maximization implies that every individual in the safety net game 
chooses a zero loss avoidance level. Maximization of the expected collective welfare, 
however, would lead to avoidance of any losses, owed to the above made assumption 
ii xcLxp ∀≥)(' . By the standard backward induction argument, the equilibrium of the 
finitely repeated game involves zero loss avoidance levels in each stage.  
The linear public goods game (PGG): the deterministic benchmark 
As deterministic control to the safety net game we consider the well-known linear public 
goods game by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984). In contrast to the standard gains 
framing, however, our public goods game involves a loss framing. 3 
Consider a group of n  individuals who simultaneously decide on the reduction of an 
individual loss to be born by the group. By choosing the loss avoidance level ];0[ xxi ∈  
the individual reduces the loss to the group at a constant unit cost c. The group members 
equally share the sum of non-avoided individual losses. Assume individuals 
symmetrically maximize the following utility function.  
(3) [ ]xxnbxLcxauLxU jn
j
jiiii ;0);/)(();(
1
∈−−−= ∑
=
   
Rearranging terms, La −  is equivalent to the endowment of the individual in the 
standard gain framing of the linear public goods game, and the marginal per capita 
return of a unit contributed to loss avoidance is nb / . Thus, our setting is equivalent to 
Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984). For given ),1( nb∈ , as standard assumption, complete 
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loss avoidance is collectively rational. However, given the contribution of the others, 
individuals’ best response is to contribute nothing in group interest. In accordance with 
the safety net game, collective free-riding occurs in the unique equilibrium of the finitely 
repeated game. Therefore both the public goods game and the safety net game are social 
dilemmas. In contrast to the safety net game where the individual contributes to a 
reduction of the loss probability, however, the individual contributes to a proportional 
reduction of the loss in the public goods game.  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN & TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 
The experimental design includes three treatments; the safety net game (SNG) as 
described in section 3.2, the individual control treatment (IND) in which the individual 
faces full liability of the incurred risk as described in section 3.1, and the deterministic 
public goods control treatment (PGG) as described in section 3.3.  
Parameterization 
The following experimental parameter values were chosen. Subjects faced a (gross) 
endowment of 150=a , marginal group return 2=b , loss avoidance costs 1=c , and a 
potential loss of 100=L . Subjects were asked to choose a loss avoidance level between 
zero and the maximum level 50=x . All amounts refer to Eurocent. In the treatments 
SNG and IND, individual threshold levels is  were drawn from a uniform distribution on 
the interval }50,...,1{  to determine if the individual loss was incurred or avoided. If the 
chosen loss avoidance level weakly exceeded the threshold level, that is ii sx ≥ , the loss 
was avoided; otherwise, that is, if the subject’s loss avoidance level was lower than the 
threshold level, the loss was incurred. As pointed out above, the subject incurred 
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(avoided) the loss with certainty by choosing the zero (maximum) loss avoidance level. 
The SNG and the PGG treatments involved groups of size 4=n  in a partners setting. 
Hence, our parameterization implies the opposing corner solutions for the IND treatment, 
ii xcLxp ∀=≥= 12)(' , and the SNG treatment, ii xcnLxp ∀=<= 150/25/)(' .  
Table 1 records the resulting payoff functions along with the theoretical equilibrium 
prediction on loss avoidance levels and payoffs. The event of loss avoidance is indicated 
by the binary variable iI , which takes value 1 if ii xs >  and 0 otherwise. Therefore, 
treatments are similar in that each unit increase in ix  reduces the expected loss incurred 
through subject i  by two units. However, treatments are different in the allocation of 
losses. While in IND each additional Eurocent spent on loss avoidance increases the 
expected per capita return by two, in SNG and PGG, each additional Eurocent spent on 
loss avoidance increases the expected per capita return by one half because losses are 
allocated in equal shares among group members. Although, the expected payoffs in SNG 
and PGG are equivalent for any given strategy profile, the increase of the expected payoff 
in SNG is affected through a reduction in the loss probability, whereas in PGG it is 
affected through an increased cash payoff.  
Procedures 
Each treatment involved ten periods (i.e., repetitions) with feedback information. In the 
SNG treatment, subjects received private information on their own chosen loss avoidance 
levels, their individual threshold levels, their own losses, the sum of group losses 
including the own loss, and their individual payoff. This information was permanently 
available in a table for each past period. In the IND and the PGG treatments, the received 
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information was equivalent to the one of the SNG treatment.  However, no information 
about the other subjects’ losses was available in the IND treatment, and no threshold 
levels were recorded in the PGG treatment.  
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
The information on the sum of group losses was less transparent in the SNG than in the 
PGG. In the PGG treatment, the losses fully revealed the sum of loss avoidance levels 
while, in the SNG treatment, losses only reveal that subjects have exerted loss avoidance 
levels below the maximum. If a loss occurs, however, one can not tell if it is owed to low 
loss avoidance levels or rather owed to bad luck. This lack of transparency provokes the 
moral hazard or hidden action problem highlighted in the literature. In our setting this 
problem has two dimensions. On one hand, free-riders have an advantage as they are able 
to cover their low cooperation levels without fearing immediate punishment; on the other 
hand, cooperators have a disadvantage as they may have to incur higher loss avoidance 
levels to show their cooperation. If the effect of the free-rider advantage is larger 
(smaller) than the effect of cooperators’ disadvantage, loss avoidance levels should be 
lower (higher). The moral hazard literature proposes the dominance of the free-rider 
advantage only, and neglects the effect on cooperators. 
Subjects participated only in one session and interacted with exactly three other subjects. 
Each subject participated to the SNG treatment and to one other treatment, depending on 
the session either to IND or PGG. Treatments were conducted in different orders, thus we 
control for an order effect. Half the subjects played the SNG treatment in the first run and 
the other half played the SNG treatment in the second run of the session. In total, we 
conducted four sessions to be identified by the following treatment orders: IND-SNG, 
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SNG-IND, PGG-SNG, and SNG-PGG. The comparison of the two first sessions informs 
us about an order effect with respect to risk taking when being switched from limited to 
full liability, and the comparison of the latter two sessions informs us about a behavioral 
change when being switched from the non-risky to the risky public goods game and vice 
versa. Note again, groups remained the same in the first and the second treatment of a 
session and were aware of this fact in the second run. In the first run, however, subjects 
were uninformed about the second treatment.  
We conducted the sessions at the Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory (MaXLab). 
Subjects were undergraduate students of the Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, 
Germany. The experimental software was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007); 
participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). At the beginning of each 
treatment, the instructions were read aloud. Prior to interacting, subjects ran through a 
stand-alone computerized comprehension test.4 At the end of the session, we debriefed 
subjects via an onscreen questionnaire.5 Given that all subjects passed the test and given 
their replies in the debriefings, we are confident that the instructions were understood. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We conducted four sessions with 28 subjects each. Each of the 112 subjects participated 
in exactly one session including two experimental treatments of 10 periods. Per session, 
we collected seven independent observations of four-subject groups. Since every subject 
participated in the SNG treatment and one other treatment, the data consist of 28 
independent observations for the SNG treatment, and 14 independent observations each 
for the PGG and IND treatments. The experimental design involves both a within-
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subjects component (as each subject participated in two different treatments) and a 
between-subjects component (as each subject participated in one session of the SNG). 
Each experimental session lasted about an hour. Subjects’ average earnings were 17.44 
Euro in the sessions that included the IND treatment and 14.83 Euro in the sessions that 
included the PGG treatment. No additional show-up fee was paid. Based on the following 
result, the subsequent analysis is conducted on the pooled data regardless of the treatment 
order. 
Observation 1: We observe no order effect. There are no significant differences 
between the first-run and second-run loss avoidance levels for any treatment 
(SNG, PGG and IND). 
The observation is supported by the outcomes of the random effects dummy regression of 
group loss avoidance levels on a time trend.6 The results are recorded in Table 2 for each 
treatment; and in the appendix the results are detailed for the SNG treatment in Table A1. 
The binary variable Run2Dummy takes value 0 for the first run and 1 for the second run 
of a session. This variable is interacted on the intercept and slope (Run2Dummy × 
Period). Thus we test for order effects on initial levels and dynamics. The data show that 
both of these coefficients are not significant at the 10% level. In favor of higher statistical 
power, hence, we subsequently focus on the pooled data per treatment.7   
Observation 2: Loss avoidance levels decline in the SNG and the PGG 
treatments. 
The variable Period in Table 2 reveals the time trend of the treatments. The coefficient is 
significantly negative for the SNG and the PGG. The positive coefficient for the IND is 
only marginally significant. The effects are illustrated for every treatment in Figure 1 
which displays the average loss avoidance levels and plots the differences between 
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treatments. Over all periods, the average loss avoidance levels were 57%, 42%, and 88% 
of the endowment in the SNG, PGG, and IND treatments (see also Table A2).  
Observation 3: Loss avoidance levels in the SNG treatment are lower than in the 
IND treatment and higher than in the PGG treatment. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
Statistical support for Observation 3 is given by the random effects dummy regression of 
group loss avoidance levels on a time trend across treatments, which is recorded in Table 
3. The regression involves the binary treatment variable SNG which takes value 1 for 
treatment SNG and 0 otherwise. In column (5) of Table 3, the significant positive effect 
of this treatment variable indicates the absolutely higher loss avoidance levels in the SNG 
compared to the PGG. Obviously, the risk exposure in the SNG influences behavior. The 
treatment variable is also interacted on the slope (SNG × Period). The coefficient, 
however, indicates no difference in the decline of loss avoidance levels. In Figure 1 we 
have seen that the loss avoidance levels of these two treatments decline in parallel. 
Relative to the IND treatment, on the other hand, we observe a negative treatment effect 
of the SNG in both average loss avoidance level and dynamics as indicated in column (6). 
The loss avoidance levels of the IND are both absolutely higher and non-decreasing over 
periods.  
 [Insert Figure 1 here.] 
Having made these observations, the questions arise in what way and why subjects in the 
SNG exert higher loss avoidance levels than in the PGG? In reply to these questions we 
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start by examining the observed behavior in the distributions of loss avoidance levels 
before we turn to the between-treatments analysis of the dynamics.  
The distributions are plotted in Figure 2 for each treatment. The distribution of the SNG 
generally dominates the one of the PGG; this pattern is persistent from the first to the last 
period of the experiment.8 The distributions are presented along with a two-step OLS 
regression which smooth the distributions on the segments [0,..., 24] and [25,..., 49], 
respectively.9 Compared to the distribution of the PGG which is rather kinkless over the 
two segments, as also indicated by the regression lines, the distribution of the SNG 
exhibits an important jump at loss avoidance level 25. Less mass of the distribution of 
loss avoidance levels is located towards the lower half of the endowment in the SNG than 
in the PGG treatment.  
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
Observation 4: There are fewer observations of low loss avoidance levels [0, .., 
24] and more of intermediate loss avoidance levels [25, .., 49] for the SNG 
treatment than for the PGG treatment. Compared to the IND, there are fewer 
maximum loss avoidance levels and more low loss avoidance levels in the SNG.  
 
Statistical support for Observation 4 is given by the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test for matched samples. The null-hypothesis of equal loss avoidance levels in the SNG 
and the PGG treatments is rejected at the 5%-level for both low loss avoidance levels (p = 
0.005),10 and for intermediate loss avoidance levels (p = 0.003). The frequencies of high 
loss avoidance levels, xxi = , are not significantly different (p = 0.722). In line with the 
equilibrium predictions, the equivalent one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test across the 
IND and the SNG indicates significant differences for the low loss avoidance levels (p = 
 17
0.001) and for the high loss avoidance levels (p = 0.001). However, the two-tailed 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test does not indicate significant differences for the intermediate 
levels (p = 0.306). 
Observation 4 suggests a shift between the distributions of the PGG and the SNG from 
the low loss avoidance level, most prominently zero loss avoidance levels, to the 
intermediate level.11 Compared to the IND, the support of the distribution on the 
intermediate level is not very different to the SNG. To interpret this evidence, we 
hypothesize that the behavior of the SNG is guided by its two components the group 
decision and the individual decision.12 Subjects react to the outcomes of the collective 
goods game and also react to the outcomes of the game of chance. To show the effect of 
the outcomes of these components in the data we examine once more the dynamics of the 
experiment.  
Observation 5: Individual loss avoidance levels of the SNG treatment are 
negatively correlated to the lagged losses of the other group members (conditional 
cooperation effect), and positively correlated to an experienced loss (social 
responsibility effect). 
 
Table 4 reports fixed effects regression results on the determinants of the individual loss 
avoidance levels. For the regressions we consider the following independent variables. In 
row f), we report the effect of the own loss incurred in the previous period, LaggedLoss. 
Row g) records the effect of the lagged average loss incurred by the other group 
members, LaggedOthers’Loss. Row h) refers to the lagged individual loss avoidance 
levels, LaggedLossAvoidanceLevel. These variables are interacted with the variable SNG 
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[see rows a): SNG × LaggedLoss, b): SNG × LaggedLossAvoidanceLevel, and c): SNG × 
LaggedOther’sLoss]. The results for the SNG treatment are reported jointly with the PGG 
treatment in column (8) and with the IND treatment in column (9). From row g) of 
column (8) we find that the loss avoidance levels depend negatively on the lagged losses 
of the others. This conditional cooperation effect (see Neugebauer et al. 2009 and 
references therein) appears to be similar in both treatments since the coefficient of the 
interacted variable indicates no significant differences between the SNG and the PGG 
treatments (row b). The experienced loss effect in the SNG treatment is evidenced from 
the significance of the interacted variable in row a).13 If subjects experience a loss, they 
tend to increase their loss avoidance levels in the next period. Note that this effect is even 
more significant in the IND treatment, see rows a) and g) of column (9). For the IND 
treatment this effect is in line with ex-post rational adjustment behavior (Selten and 
Stöcker 1986; Selten and Buchta 1994). In hindsight, subjects in the IND treatment could 
have earned a higher payoff in the previous period. In adaptive manner, subjects increase 
rather than decrease their loss avoidance level if they incurred a loss in the prior period, 
and they rather decrease than increase their loss avoidance level when the loss did not 
occur. Owed to the limited liability of subjects in the SNG, however, this behavior cannot 
be explained by ex-post rational adjustments. We may want to refer to this reaction as a 
social responsibility effect. Subjects act as if they anticipated regret for their losses and 
efficiency loss they impose on the group, and they avoid further losses by increasing their 
loss avoidance levels. Similar to the public goods game, however, the actions are more 
frequently chosen in the interior than on the boundaries of the action space. This fact 
could be a source for why our results differ to those observed in the related binary choice 
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task by Berger and Hershey (1994). Berger and Hershey suggested that risk rather 
decreases the cooperation levels in public goods games whereas, in our study, risk 
improves cooperation levels. 
[Insert Table 4 here.] 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper introduces the safety net game in which members of a group choose avoidance 
levels to prevent a likely individual loss which is socially indemnified within the group. 
The safety net game involves the moral hazard problem since the group members have 
limited liability for any loss they impose on the group and since their individual actions 
are unobservable by the others. If a loss occurs, it is hard to prove, in hindsight, that it 
occurred due to the lack of loss avoidance measures or rather due to chance. We 
discussed the safety net game theoretically and reported experimental results and 
compared it to two control treatments; the full-liability individual decision task and the 
non-risky linear public goods game. For the safety net game and for the public goods 
game, standard theory predicts free-riding. Under full liability, in contrast, theory predicts 
the choice of the maximal loss avoidance level. As for the full liability control treatment, 
the experimental data support the theoretical prediction that the loss avoidance levels are 
lower in the safety net game than under full liability. Although this result is not 
surprising, the difference between the two treatments is surprising as it is far smaller than 
predicted. There are two reasons for this deviation from the theoretical prediction. On one 
hand, the full liability treatment elicited relatively high levels of risk taking as only 88% 
of the disposable resources were employed on loss avoidance rather than the predicted 
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100%. On the other hand, the safety net game treatment elicited lower risk taking levels 
as 56% of the resources were employed rather than the predicted 0%. Thus, despite no 
differences in the theoretical prediction, the observed avoidance levels of the safety net 
game were significantly greater than the 42% average loss avoidance level observed in 
the public goods game. However, the dynamics of the two games were statistically 
indistinguishable from another as subjects adjust their loss avoidance levels conditionally 
on the others’ observed losses,  
Our observations suggest that the higher loss avoidance levels compared to the public 
goods game result from the risk exposure of cooperative individuals. To show 
cooperation under hidden action the individual loss avoidance level must be sufficiently 
high to weather the move of nature. So instead of hiding behind the outcomes of nature as 
suggested in the moral hazard line of reasoning, subjects’ cooperation levels are shifted 
from the lower half of action space to the upper half in an attempt to make a loss less 
likely to occur. If a subject fails to avoid the loss in one period, our data show that the 
loss avoidance level is increased in response to this loss in the following period. We 
interpret this effect as socially responsible behavior. Subjects behave as if responsible for 
imposing a loss on the group even though they have only limited liability. However, we 
also observe in line with the theory that some subjects ride free on the others, the 
predicted zero loss avoidance level is chosen in 18% of all decisions. The number of free-
riders increases with repetition, however, following a similar pattern as in the public 
goods game. The loss avoidance levels evolve inversely to the observed losses incurred 
by the other group members. So, risk taking increases gradually as response to the 
observed erosion of moral standards.  
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This observation is consistent with the findings of Grossman (1992); in his empirical 
study on the effect of federal deposit insurance on thrift risk taking he writes (p. 819): 
“While newly insured thrifts undertook less risk than their uninsured counterparts, moral 
hazard emerged gradually. The results […] indicate that after having been insured for 
approximately five years an insured institution’s risk-taking surpassed that of its 
uninsured counterpart […]. Once insured, however, thrift managers felt free to undertake 
more risk.”  
Although the moral hazard problem observed in the data is not as dramatic as expected in 
theory, the increase of risk taking suggests a gradual erosion of social responsibility. 
There are at least two political measures that can be taken to mitigate this erosion which 
have also been discussed in the literature (Holmstrom 1979). First, the insurance 
literature suggests that the inclusion of a deductible upon a realized loss can enhance 
moral standards as participants’ liability is increased. The crucial question in this context, 
indeed, is on the size of the deductible that would lead to the desirable outcome. Second, 
the literature on agency problems suggests a monitoring of the agent’s actions. Here the 
question arises how probable a monitoring must be owed to the costs of monitoring in 
safety nets. A sensible policy might be the introduction of monitoring in the frame of an 
alert system. Upon a realized loss and increasingly with every further loss, monitoring 
efforts must be increased. Monitoring must be accompanied by a reasonable sanction of 
defectors who -in the worst case- might face exclusion from the safety net. Such 
measures do not only discipline defectors but also serve as a general moral support for 
social responsibility. These relevant questions on sensible political measures to support 
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the maintenance of moral standards, which can also be addressed within the safety net 
game experiment, obviously call for further research. 
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APPENDIX 
[Insert Table A1 here.] 
[Insert Table A2 here.] 
[Insert Table A3 here.] 
[Insert Figure A1 here.] 
[Insert Figure A2 here.] 
[Insert Figure A3 here.] 
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INSTRUCTIONS (TRANSLATION) 
 
(Any treatment) Welcome to the experiment! Please switch off your mobile telephone! Please pay attention 
to the following instructions and inform the instructor in case you experience problems in understanding. 
During the entire experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any other participant. If you do 
communicate with other participants you will have to abandon the experiment immediately and you lose all 
claims regarding payment. By participating in the experiment you contribute to the experimental research 
on individual decision making. Therefore, it is important that you make all your decisions on your own! 
 
Instructions independent of the order 
 
The IND treatment 
In the experiment you are going to make individual decisions in ten periods.  
In every period, you will receive an endowment of 150 Eurocent. You decide on the allocation of an integer 
amount between 0 and 50 Eurocents in order to avoid a personal loss of 100 Eurocents.  
With every allocated Eurocent, you reduce the likelihood of the loss. The incurrence of the loss is 
determined by chance and depends on your allocated amount.  
In each period the computer randomly determines a personal threshold level, an integer between 1 and 50. 
If your allocated amount is greater or equal to this threshold level the loss is avoided. If the allocated 
amount is smaller you incur a loss of 100 Eurocents. 
Note: The threshold level always exceeds 0, and never exceeds 50. Hence, the loss is certain if your 
allocated amount is 0 and loss avoidance is certain if your allocated amount is 50 Eurocents. Hence, your 
payoff in any period equals 
 
150 (your endowment) – your allocated amount to avoid the loss – 100 (if you incur the loss)  
 
You make all your decisions on the computer. After each period the following information is displayed in a 
table: period, allocated amount, threshold level, your incurred loss, period payoff.  
 
The SNG treatment 
In the experiment you are going to interact with three other participants in a group of four for ten periods. 
The composition of the group will stay the same throughout the entire experiment. The identity of the 
group members will be randomly determined at the beginning and will not be revealed to you at any time. 
In every period, you will receive an endowment of 150 Eurocent. You decide on the allocation of an integer 
amount between 0 and 50 Eurocents in order to avoid a personal loss of 100 Eurocents. 
With every allocated Eurocent, you reduce the likelihood of the loss. The incurrence of the loss is 
determined by chance and depends on your allocated amount.  
In each period the computer randomly determines a personal threshold level, an integer between 1 and 50.  
If your allocated amount is greater or equal to this threshold level the loss is avoided. If the allocated 
amount is smaller you incur a loss of 100 Eurocents. 
Note: The threshold level always exceeds 0, and never exceeds 50. Hence, the loss is certain if your 
allocated amount is 0 and loss avoidance is certain if your allocated amount is 50 Eurocents.  
If you incur a loss it is equally divided between the members of your group. In other words, you share your 
loss with the others. Likewise, you share the incurred losses of the other group members. Hence, your 
payoff in any period equals 
 
150 (your endowment)  
– your allocated amount to avoid the loss  
– 100 (if you incur the loss) /4  
– 100 (for each loss incurred by the other three group members) /4  
 
[In other words, 150 – your allocated amount – incurred losses of the group/4] 
 
You make all your decisions on the computer. After each period the following information is displayed in a 
table: period, allocated amount, threshold level, your incurred loss, sum of all incurred losses, your quarter 
of all incurred losses, period payoff.  
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The PGG treatment 
In the experiment you are going to interact with three other participants in a group of four for ten periods. 
The composition of the group will stay the same throughout the entire experiment. The identity of the 
group members will be randomly determined at the beginning and will not be revealed to you at any time. 
In every period, you will receive an endowment of 150 Eurocent. You decide on the allocation of an integer 
amount between 0 and 50 Eurocents in order to avoid a personal loss of 100 Eurocents. 
With every allocated Eurocent, you reduce the maximum loss by 2 Eurocents.  
If you incur a loss it is equally divided between the members of your group. In other words, you share your 
loss with the others. Likewise, you share the incurred losses of the other group members. Hence, your 
payoff in any period equals 
 
150 (your endowment)  
– your allocated amount to avoid the loss  
– [100 (loss) – 2 times your allocated amount]/4  
– [100 (loss) – 2 times allocated amount (for each of the other three group members)] /4  
 
[In other words, 150 – your allocated amount – incurred losses of the group/4] 
 
You make all your decisions on the computer. After each period the following information is displayed in a 
table: period, allocated amount, your incurred loss, sum of all incurred losses, your quarter of all incurred 
losses, period payoff.  
 
COMPUTER SUPPORTED QUIZ (DESCRIPTION) 
 
Before starting the SNG and the PGG treatment subjects faced a comprehension test. The test involved two 
screens. On the first screen, subjects were prompted to insert eight (four in PGG) integers between 1 and 50 
(without being told that that was part of a quiz). On the second screen, subjects faced these numbers in a 
different order, representing allocated amounts to avoid the loss by four fictitious players and their 
threshold levels (not in PGG). Based on these numbers and the random arrangement of the numbers on the 
screen, subjects had to compute the payoff for each fictitious player. Subjects confirmed their computations 
by a press on a button. However, only if they had passed the test they could continue the experiment. The 
treatment started when all subjects had passed. 
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ENDNOTES
                                                 
 
 
1 Only the experimental literature is surveyed in this section. A related theoretical study has recently been 
published by Lohse, Robledo and Schmidt (forthcoming). 
 
2 As cost, loss and loss avoidance levels are non-negative numbers, the lower bound is sufficiently defined. 
3 An equivalent parameterization has been used in the standard gain framing design of the linear public 
goods game, for instance, by Croson, Fatas and Neugebauer (2005). In an early draft of the present study, 
we used a gain framing for the treatments IND and SNG. The results were qualitatively equal. However, 
since there were some subject pool differences, we do not report the results here. Nonetheless the data and 
the early draft can be obtained upon request. 
 
4 The translated instructions and a description of the onscreen-test are appended to the paper. 
 
5 As the experiment involves decision making under risk, we asked subjects to state their risk preferences 
on a scale from 1 to 7. This task was not incentivized. The average reported level was 4.375, indicating risk 
aversion rather than risk loving. Correlating 28 individual average loss avoidance levels in IND and PGG 
and 56 in SNG to the stated level of risk aversion the Spearman rank correlation coefficients are 0.347 in 
IND (the p-value of the one-sided test is 0.035), 0.204 in PGG, and -0.029 in SNG. For IND, thus, we find 
weak evidence that subjects who stated a lower risk preference chose higher loss avoidance levels. We find 
no comparable evidence for the other treatments.  
 
6 Our panel data regression results are in line with the outcomes of the Hausman test; that is, unless the 
coefficients of the fixed effects model and the random effects model are significantly different, the random 
effects regression results are reported. 
 
7 Nevertheless, the subsequently reported observations are fully in line with each treatment order.  
8 The two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov between-sample test confirms the dominance of the aggregate 
distribution between samples for the first ten periods (p = 0.000). The figures A1-A3 in the appendix show 
the evolution of distributions over the periods for the three treatments.  
 
9 The slope and intercept of the step-wise linear regressions are recorded in Table A3 of the appendix, 
where also the linear OLS regression is reported for the purpose of comparison. The squared deviation of 
the loss avoidance level distribution from the regression-slope without step is only 1.5 times the sum of 
squared deviations of the two-step regression in case of the PGG, whereas 11.47 times and 8.93 times for 
the SNG and IND, respectively. The reported determination coefficients show the effect, too. 
 
10 The between-treatments test indicates in the same direction, although the Mann-Whitney test is not 
significant (p=0.149).  
 
11 We observe that the zero loss avoidance level is exerted in 18% of the decisions in the SNG. In the first 
and last period the relative frequencies are 10% and 27% (see Figure A1 and Table A2). These numbers are 
not only much smaller than the theoretically predicted 100%, but also half the size and significantly 
different to the PGG treatment where the level is 35.36% (see Figure A2 and Table A2). According to the 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, the relative frequencies of zero loss avoidance levels are significantly different 
between the SNG treatment and the PGG treatment (p = 0.002). The one-tailed test between SNG and IND 
is also significant (p=.000).  
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12 In contrast to the PGG where subjects contribute to the public good a certain amount, in the SNG they 
contribute a lottery whose odds are determined by their chosen loss avoidance level. In this way we speak 
of the two components of the SNG.  
 
13 Note that the lagged loss avoidance level corresponds to the lagged own loss in the PGG treatment, but in 
the SNG treatment this equivalence is not given, owed to the stochastic component. Therefore, we check 
the effect of the lagged loss through the lines a), c), and h) of column (8). Line h) indicates a path 
dependence effect; the loss avoidance level positively correlates with the loss avoidance level in the 
previous period.  
 31
TABLES and FIGURES 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Experimental Setting and Prediction 
Treatment Payoff function 
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TABLE 2 
Order Effect: Random Effects Regression of Average Loss Avoidance Levels 
Independent  
Variables 
(1) 
SNG 
 (2) 
PGG 
(3) 
IND 
    
Run2Dummy 5.813 -0.452 1.243 
 (3.793) (7.065) (2.155) 
    
Run2Dummy × Period -0.249 -0.009 0.165 
 (0.245) (0.387) (0.167) 
    
Period -1.334*** -1.164*** 0.216* 
 (0.173) (0.274) (0.118) 
    
Constant 33.43*** 27.60*** 41.82*** 
 (2.682) (4.996) (1.524) 
    
Observations 280 140 140 
Independent groups 28 14 14 
Wald test 144.1 36.49 15.06 
    
Notes: The dependent variable is the average loss avoidance level of a group in period t.Run2Dummy takes value 0 
for the first and 1 for the second ten periods. Period takes values {1… 10} according to the period of the treatment. 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 3 
Treatment effect: random effects regression of average loss avoidance levels 
Independent  
Variables 
 (5) 
PGG 
(6) 
IND 
   
SNG 7.296*** -4.451*** 
 (1.574) (1.467) 
   
SNG × Period -0.290 -1.757*** 
 (0.245) (0.229) 
   
Period -1.168*** 0.299 
 (0.200) (0.187) 
   
Constant 29.04*** 40.79*** 
 (2.192) (1.927) 
   
Observations 420 420 
Independent groups 28 28 
Wald test 189.5 475.7 
 
Note: The average loss avoidance level of a group in period t is the dependent variable in PGG and IND sessions. 
SNG takes value 1 for the SNG and 0 for the other treatments. Period takes values {1… 10} according to the period 
of the treatment. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4 
Dynamics of the loss effect: fixed effects regression of individual loss avoidance levels 
 
Independent 
Variables 
(8) 
PGG 
(9) 
IND 
a) SNG × LaggedLoss 0.0250** -0.0379* 
 (0.0114) (0.0201) 
b) SNG × LaggedOthers’Loss 0.0120  
 (0.00862)  
c) SNG × LaggedLossAvoidanceLevel 0.0974** -0.0943 
 (0.0454) (0.0779) 
d) SNG × Period -0.0783 -0.895*** 
 (0.254) (0.216) 
e) SNG -2.210 1.621 
 (2.736) (3.682) 
f) LaggedLoss  0.0609*** 
  (0.0175) 
g) LaggedOthers’Loss -0.0310***  
 (0.00832)  
h) LaggedLossAvoidanceLevel 0.334*** 0.644*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0716) 
i) Period -0.702*** 0.103 
 (0.206) (0.174) 
j) Constant 22.99*** 14.00*** 
 (2.105) (3.332) 
Observations 1512 1512 
Independent groups 112 112 
R-squared 0.238 0.455 
   
Note: Dependent variable: average loss avoidance level of subject i in period t, Independent variables: SNG (Dummy 
1 if SNG, 0 if PGG and IND, respectively), LaggedLoss (incurred loss in t-1), LaggedOther’sLoss (average of 
incurred loss of others in t-1), LaggedLossAvoidanceLevel (subject’s chosen loss avoidance level in t-1), Period 
(current period 1, 2, …, 10) and interaction variables SNG × Y where Y = {LaggedLoss, LaggedLossAvoidanceLevel, 
LaggedOther’sLoss, Period}. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A1 
Random effects regression: absence of order effect in the SNG 
 
Independent variables 
SNG_PGG vs 
SNG_IND 
SNG1 vs 
SNG2_PGG 
SNG1 vs 
SNG2_IND 
SNG2_PGG vs 
SNG2_IND 
SNG1_PGG vs 
SNG1_IND 
          
Run2Dummy 5.377 3.733 7.893 4.160 6.595 
 (3.829) (4.907) (5.024) (4.390) (6.325) 
      
Run2Dummy × Period -0.338 -0.0496 -0.449 -0.399 -0.277 
 (0.245) (0.287) (0.298) (0.371) (0.321) 
      
Period -1.289*** -1.334*** -1.334*** -1.383*** -1.195*** 
 (0.173) (0.166) (0.172) (0.262) (0.227) 
      
Constant 33.65*** 33.43*** 33.43*** 37.16*** 30.13*** 
 (2.708) (2.833) (2.901) (3.104) (4.472) 
      
Observations 280 210 210 140 140 
Independent groups 28 21 21 14 14 
Wald test 144.9 99.88 115.1 74.25 70.59 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the average loss avoidance level of a group in period t. Run2Dummy is a binary variable, which takes 
value 0 for the first and 1 for the second ten periods. Period is the period number of the treatment and takes values {1… 10} accordingly.  
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A2 
Loss Avoidance Levels: Descriptive Statistics 
    IND SNG PGG 
Relative 
frequency x=0 
First period 0.00% 9.82% 25.00% 
Last period 0.00% 30.36% 57.14% 
Average 0.36% 18.13% 35.36% 
     
Relative 
frequency x<25 
First period 8.93% 29.46% 48.21% 
Last period 7.14% 58.93% 75.00% 
Average 5.54% 43.30% 59.82% 
     
Relative 
frequency 
25≤x<50 
First period 44.64% 37.50% 19.64% 
Last period 37.50% 30.36% 17.64% 
Average 43.21% 35.89% 18.39% 
     
Relative 
frequency x=50 
First period 46.43% 33.04% 32.14% 
Last period 55.36% 10.71% 7.14% 
Average 51.25% 20.80% 21.79% 
     
Average  
absolute level 
First period 43.09 34.68 26.23 
Last period 44.61 20.75 12.38 
Average 44.08 28.31 20.94 
     
N  56 112 56 
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TABLE A3 
OLS Regression for various Segments of the Loss Avoidance Level Distribution 
 
 
 
 
  
 Model Variable  SNG PGG IND 
       
2-step OLS Intercept 0.370 0.200 0.002 
 Loss avoidance level 0.008 0.005 0.001 
 D25 0.032 0.085 -0.031 
 D25 × Loss avoidance level 0.001 0.011 0.016 
 Adj – R-squared .991 .994 .976 
     
OLS Intercept 0.358 0.110 -0.090 
  Loss avoidance level 0.009 0.013 0.009 
 Adj – R-squared .987 .936 .793 
     
 
Note: The dependent variable is the cumulative relative frequency of the loss avoidance level. D25 is a binary 
variable, which takes value 0 for loss avoidance level below 25 and 1 otherwise. 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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FIGURE 1  
Average Loss Avoidance Levels 
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FIGURE 2  
Distribution of loss avoidance levels and step-wise linear approximation 
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FIGURE A1 
Cumulative distribution of loss avoidance levels by periods in SNG 
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FIGURE A2 
Cumulative distribution of loss avoidance levels by periods in PGG 
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FIGURE A3 
Cumulative distribution of loss avoidance levels by periods in IND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
